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Abstract
Beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between ﬁscal de-
centralization and aggregate government size (national and subnational combined), this
paper makes the ﬁrst attempt to examine how different ﬁscal decentralization measures
affect the sizes of national and subnational (state and local combined) governments.
An econometric analysis using panel data from 32 industrial and developing countries,
1980–1994, ﬁnds that (1) expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national govern-
ments, larger subnational governments, and larger aggregate governments; (2) revenue
decentralization increases subnational governments by less than it reduces national gov-
ernments, hence leads to smaller aggregate governments; and (3) vertical imbalance tends
to increase the sizes of subnational, national, and aggregate governments.  2002 Elsevier
Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
With the dramatic growth of the public sector during the twentieth century,
many economists have questioned the effectiveness of the government’s role in
publicservice provisionand createda presumptionin favor ofreducingthe size of
the public sector by giving more power to both the market and local jurisdictions.
Fiscal decentralization is seen as a mechanism to control the growth of the public
sector and improve the efﬁciency in public services (see Tanzi [1] for a recent
review, and Davoodi and Zou [2] and Zhang and Zou [3] for empirical evidence).
It is also proposed as an important element of public-sector reform in developing
countries in the last two decades (Bahl and Linn [4], Shah [5], Fukasaku and de
Mello [6], and Inman and Rubinfeld [7]).
General discussions center on two important channels through which ﬁscal
decentralization could reduce the size of government—politicalparticipation and
ﬁscal (tax) competition. The political participation argument suggests giving
citizens and their elected representatives more power in public decision making.
Since the local population has strong incentives to discipline local public ofﬁcials
and can monitor the local authorities closely, to the extent that local services are
ﬁnanced by the jurisdiction’s own revenue, decentralization can lead to higher
civic participation,improvedcitizen control over the action of the public ofﬁcials,
and a smaller government(Stein [8]).
The ﬁscal (tax) competition argument suggests decentralization itself is a
powerful constraint on the Leviathan: “Competition among governments in the
context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of ‘ﬁscal gains’
can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit ﬁscal constraints on
the taxing power” (Brennan and Buchanan [9]).
But Oates [10] indicates that from the perspective of economies of scale,
ﬁscal decentralization may be relatively expensive in budgetary terms. An even
stronger hypothesis suggested by John Wallis (quoted in Oates [10]) is that, since
individuals have more control over public decisions at the subnational levels than
at the national level,they may empowerthe local public sector with an evenwider
range of functions and responsibilities when they are carried out by local levels
of government.Thereby,the size of subnational(state and local) governmentscan
be larger, the more decentralized is ﬁscal decisionmaking.
Despite many efforts by scholars of ﬁscal decentralization, including Oates’s
[10], there is no theoretical or empirical consensus on a systematic relationship
between ﬁscal decentralization and the relative size of aggregate public sector
(the sum of national and subnational governments). If we consider the effects
of ﬁscal decentralization on national and subnational government size (state
and local combined) separately, the relationship at each level may be different.
It is obvious that decentralization should increase the size of subnational
governments while shrinking the size of the national government. But the effect
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determinedbecause it dependson the relative magnitudeof its effects on the sizes
of subnational and national governments.
This paper extends recent studies on the relationship between ﬁscal decentral-
ization and government size by taking the following approaches: (1) considering
three different measures of ﬁscal decentralization—expenditure and revenue de-
centralization, and vertical imbalance—and their different effects on aggregate
government size, (2) disaggregating the effects of ﬁscal decentralization on gov-
ernment size at national and subnational levels (per John Wallis’s suggestion),
and (3) controlling for political and administrative decentralization in the econo-
metric analyses.
Section 2 reviewstheoretical andempirical studieson the relationshipbetween
ﬁscal decentralization and aggregate government size. Section 3 describes our
approaches, the panel data set, and the empirical methodology used. Section 4
reports the regression results. Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Theoretical arguments and existing empirical evidence
2.1. Theoretical arguments
From the perspective of allocative efﬁciency, various arguments have long
been put forward in the public ﬁnance literature to support the view that
decentralization would lead to greater efﬁciency and a leaner public sector
(Tiebout[11]andOates[12]).TheLeviathanmodelbyBrennanandBuchanan[9]
presents the most dramatized theoretical case on how ﬁscal decentralization can
reduce the size of government. In their model, government is a monolithic entity
that systematically seeks to maximize ﬁscal revenues, and it can only be limited
by constitutional constraints. In particular, the decentralization of revenue and
expenditure assignments can create a market-like solution and therefore limit
government’s excessive taxing power at the corresponding levels. Furthermore,
when mobile individuals seeking maximum ﬁscal beneﬁts “vote with their feet,”
thisbehaviorgeneratescompetitionamongjurisdictions.Suchcompetition,which
is in line with the Tiebout model, limits a subnational government’s excessive
taxing power, encourages cost-efﬁcient production and supply of local public
goods and services, and thereby, restrains growth of the subnational governments
and hence the aggregate public sector. In brief, “total government intrusions
into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to
which taxes and expenditures are decentralized” (Brennan and Buchanan [9]).
Moreover, introducing elements of competition into the political process could
improve governments’ responsiveness. With democratic election of government
ofﬁcials at subnational levels, decentralization could increase the accountability
of government actions, and endow voters with more power to discipline public
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Challengers of the Leviathan model outline conditions under which decentral-
ization could be a less attractive policy tool (Prud’homme [13] and Tanzi [1]).
Supply efﬁciency (economies of scale). For example, Prud’homme [13] argues
that (1) the hypothesis that decentralization will better serve the demands
generated by diversiﬁed preferences only holds if supply is always efﬁcient;
and (2) the Leviathanmodellacks an emphasis on supply efﬁciencyin the context
of economies of scale. If economies of scale in the provision of public services
are substantial, decentralization may result in larger government (Stein [8]).
Political participation. The Leviathanmodelalso assumes that taxpayers/voters
of each jurisdiction will express their preferences in their votes, and that higher
civicparticipationandbettercitizencontrolovertheactionsofpublicofﬁcialswill
result in a smaller public sector. According to Prud’homme [13], this hypothesis
may not hold for local electoral behavior in developing countries. Where local
electionsexist,theyareusuallydecidedonthe basis ofpersonal,tribal,orpolitical
party loyalties.
Flypaper effect. Fiscal imbalances bridged with intergovernmental grants can
signiﬁcantly stimulate expenditures by recipient subnational governments (Oates
[10,14]; see also Nelson [15] and Zax [16]). Stein [8] comes to a similar
conclusion: subnational governments that receive transfers spend them more
easily than they spend local tax revenues. The implication is that if a signiﬁcant
part of subnational government spending is ﬁnanced through transfers from the
higher level of government, decentralization could lead to growth in government.
The problem of the commons. This problem arises from a disconnection
between beneﬁciaries of public services and those who pay for them. If revenues
remain centralized to a large degree while expenditures are decentralized, and
if discretionary transfers bridge such vertical imbalance, the commons problem
may be more serious than using a transfer mechanism based on predetermined
formula.Because discretionarytransferstendto be allocatedto those jurisdictions
that are in ﬁnancial trouble (Stein [8]), subnational governments will overspend
in order to ask for additional funds from the national government. Thus,
ﬁscal decentralization with a large discrepancy between subnational revenues
and expenditures may be morally hazardous and contribute to the growth of
governments.
Soft budget constraints. Soft budget constraints on subnational governments
resulting from borrowing autonomy can potentially lead to capital-market debt
liabilities being directly or indirectly passed on to the national government.
If the national government is always ready to bail out indebted subnational
governments, then subnational governmentscan follow an expansion policy with274 J. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293
less concern about their ability to pay off the debt. This simple hypothesis of soft
budgetconstraintssuggeststhatborrowingautonomybysubnationalgovernments
is associated with increased government sizes. This association could be even
more signiﬁcant when discretionary transfers are involved.
The quality of local bureaucracies. Because national governmentbureaucracies
are more likely to offer qualiﬁed people better careers and more possibilities
of promotion, and because talented individuals tend to choose ﬁelds that offer
better opportunities for advancement over the longer run, the resulting poor
quality of local bureaucrats is likely to reduce the beneﬁts of decentralization
(Prud’homme [13]). For example, the lack of qualiﬁed ofﬁcials at subnational
levels may result in weak public expenditure management and higher costs.
Corruption. Prud’homme [13] believes that corruption may be more prevalent
at subnational levels for the following reasons: (1) Opportunities for corruption
at subnational levels are more likely because politicians and bureaucrats are
more accessible and susceptible to pressing demands from local interest groups
(whose money and votes count) in matters such as taxation or authorizations.
(2) Corruption in many cases requires the cooperation of both politicians
and bureaucrats. Such cooperation is more easily aligned at the local level
where bureaucrats have less independence from local politicians than national
bureaucrats do from national politicians. (3) Local ofﬁcials usually have more
discretion than national decisionmakers. Thus, decentralization may increase the
overall level of corruption (see Brueckner [17]).
Tanzi [1] shares the same argument by reasoning that corruption is often
stimulated by contiguity, that is, by the fact that ofﬁcials and citizens live and
work close to one another in local communities. When this occurs, the public
interest often takes a back seat, and decisions that favor particular individuals or
groups are made.
Public expenditure management systems. The necessary elements of good pub-
lic expenditure management—clear budgetary classiﬁcations, an informative
accounting system, and skilled people to forecast expected revenues and an-
ticipate spending (Tanzi [1])—are usually missing or insufﬁcient, especially in
developing countries and transition economies, and, in particular, at subnational
government levels.
2.2. Existing empirics
Oates [12], in his earlier empirical study using a cross-section sample of
57 countries, ﬁnds that higher ﬁscal centralization is associated with a smaller
public sector. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁnds a strong and statistically signiﬁcant nega-
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as a fraction of national income) and a ﬁscal centralization ratio (measured
by central government tax revenues as a percentage of total tax revenue). An-
other test by Oates [14], using a cross-section sample of 43 countries, reaches
a similar conclusion. He regresses the size of the public sector (measured by
aggregate tax revenue in each country as a fraction of GDP) on central rev-
enue as a fraction of total revenue, and central expenditure as a fraction of total
expenditure.His ﬁndings do not supportthe Leviathan hypothesis,but rather sug-
gest that a relatively decentralized public sector is typically comparatively large
(Oates [14, p. 754]). Control variables such as income, population, and govern-
ment transfers, however, contribute to a more powerful explanation for govern-
ment size than the two measures of ﬁscal centralization alone.
A mixed picture emerges from empirical studies undertaken since Oates’s
pioneering efforts. For example, Marlow [18] models the association between
decentralization and government size for the United States at the aggregate level
(federal and state level combined) using time series data for 1946–1985. He
measures aggregate public-sector size by taking total government expenditure
as a percentage of GNP. His regression of the aggregate public expenditure on
subnational expenditure as a fraction of total government expenditures and two
othercontrolvariables(realpercapitadisposableincomein1972andpopulation),
demonstratesthat ﬁscal decentralizationis negativelyassociated with government
size.
Grossman [19] explores this relationship in the US data by emphasizing the
role of intergovernmental grants, which are supposed to encourage expansion of
the publicsector byconcentratingtaxingpowerinthe nationalgovernmentandby
weakeningtheﬁscal disciplineimposedonsubnationalgovernmentsforﬁnancing
of their own expenditures. Grossman regresses aggregate government size (total
government expenditures as a share of GNP) on expenditure decentralization
(the share of state and local expenditures in total government expenditures) and
vertical imbalance (measured by the share of federal grants to state and local
governments in total state and local receipts). His result supports the Leviathan
model and indicates in particular that grants serve to encourage the expansion of
the public sector.
Froma cross-country,cross-sectionperspective,Ehdaie’s[20]ﬁndingssupport
the Leviathan hypothesis: ﬁscal decentralization (subnational own source rev-
enue over total subnational–national expenditure) is found to have a statistically
signiﬁcant negative impact on government size (subnational–national govern-
ment expenditures over GDP), whereas transfers to localities (national revenue
transfers over total subnational–national expenditure) have a positive impact on
government size. As transfers offset the negative impact of decentralization on
government size, his study highlights the importance of decentralizing taxing de-
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More recently, Stein [8] has examined the Leviathan hypothesis by employing
cross-section data from 20 Latin Americancountriesand some OECD countries.1
In additionto the explanatoryvariables of ﬁscal decentralization(i.e., expenditure
decentralization, vertical imbalance, and borrowing autonomy), Stein includes
other control variables, i.e., level of public debt in 1989, degree of openness of
the economy (measured by the share of total exports and imports in GDP), and
share of the population over 65 years of age. His regression results for the Latin
Americancase—thatdecentralizedgovernmentstendtobelarger—donotsupport
the Leviathan model.
3. Approaches, data, and methodology
3.1. Approaches
The objective of this research is to enhance our understanding of the
relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and government size from the
following aspects:
1. Relative changes of government size at both national and subnational levels.
Beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between
ﬁscal decentralization and aggregate government size, we examine how
decentralization affects the sizes of national and subnational governments.
A test only at the aggregate governmentlevel cannot distinguish the possible
differentiated effects on governmentsize at different levels.
2. Time series. Unlike the cross-section studies by Oates [14], Ehdaie [20], and
Stein [8],we addtime seriesforeachcountryin ourcross-countryregressions
to explore the dynamics of the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization
and governmentsize.
3. Variables measuring ﬁscal decentralization. Three different variables are
used to proxy the level of ﬁscal decentralization: expenditure decentraliza-
tion, measured as the ratio of subnational to total government expenditure;
revenue decentralization, measured as the ratio of subnational own source
revenue to total government revenue; and vertical imbalance, measured as
the percentage of expenditures at the subnational level ﬁnanced by central
transfers. Our approach explores the effects of these three measures of ﬁscal
decentralization and disaggregates their potential for differentiated effects on
government size.
4. Political and administrative decentralization. Although there have been
extensive discussions and research about political and administrative decen-
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tralization, little empirical research has touched upon this issue in the context
of ﬁscal decentralization. We use four variables to capture political and insti-
tutional effects on governmentsize:
• Borrowing constraints. The borrowing autonomy of subnational gov-
ernments can potentially lead to soft budget constraints. As a result,
subnational governments may directly or indirectly pass on capital-market
liabilities to upper tiers of government. National government bailouts of
subnational governments in ﬁnancial distress undermine the incentives
for the latter to behave in a ﬁscally responsible way. Any prohibition or
non-discretionary rules to constrain subnational government access to the
ﬁnancial market would result in less borrowing, which may suggest a re-
duction in subnational governmentsize.
• Unitary versus federal state. Economic constitutions make a difference.
A federal form of government with decisionmaking shared by all levels
of government is considered more decentralized in terms of decision-
making and therefore conducive to greater freedom of choice, political
participation, innovation,and accountability.A federal regime with a more
decentralizedinstitutionalarrangementissupposedtobemoreefﬁcientand
thus lead to smaller government in comparison with a unitary regime.
• Elected vs. non-electedsubnationalgovernment.Decentralization assumes
that the taxpayers/voters will express their preferences through votes
and that such voting-with-their-feet behavior would restrain subnational
governments’ taxing power.
• Lackofindependenceofthecentralbank.Itisbelievedthatanindependent
monetary authority is more likely to restrain governments from pursuing
short-term expansionary policies, and possibly limit governments’ size.
Therefore, monetary institutions may also be instrumental to a better ﬁscal
outcome.
5. Inﬂation.Becausegovernmentsizemayberelatedtorevenueandexpenditure
assignments, inﬂation is likely to erode tax revenuesand restrain government
growth if government revenue collections are not adjusted fast enough to
account for the effects of inﬂation, or if there is a delay in revenue collections
in nominal terms.
6. Other control variables. In order to establish the robustness of our result,
we further control other macro variables such as per capita growth rate
of GDP; per capita GDP in constant terms; urbanization, measured by
urban population as a share of total population; and openness, measured by
total imports and exports as percentage of GDP. These variables are quite
conventional in existing studies on governmentsize.278 J. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293
Table 1
Countries included in the study
Argentina Colombia Ireland South Africa
Australia Denmark Israel Spain
Austria France Luxembourg Sweden
Belgium Germany Malaysia Switzerland
Bolivia Iceland Mexico Thailand
Brazil India Netherlands United Kingdom
Canada Indonesia Norway United States
Chile Iran Paraguay Zimbabwe
3.2. Data
All countries included in the current study have data for at least two
levels of government in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government
Financial Statistics (GFS) [22]. Based on the availability of data, primarily at the
subnational level, we end up with 17 industrial and 15 developing countries over
15 years from 1980–1994(Table 1).
3.2.1. Dependent variables
The three dependent variables analyzed are subnational, national, and ag-
gregate government size, all measured by the ratio of total expenditure at
corresponding government level to GDP. In the case of aggregate government
size, national and subnational government expenditures are combined. All the
data come from the IMF’s GFS.
Table 2A provides some descriptive statistics on government sizes for each
country from 1980 to 1994. On average, public sectors at subnational, national,
and aggregate levels are substantially larger for the industrial countries (17, 37,
and 54%, respectively) than the ones for developing countries (6, 24, and 29%,
respectively). Moreover, subnational government size varies more signiﬁcantly
in industrial countries than that in developing countries as indicated by the
standard deviation (1.6 versus 1.3). The descriptive statistics of each country
show that in the industrial-country group, subnational government size varies
from 7% of GDP in Belgium to 32% in Denmark, whereas the same variable
for developingcountries ranges from 0.4% of GDP in Paraguay to 14% in Brazil.
In addition, national and aggregate government sizes are more widely dispersed
in developing countries than the ones in industrial countries (with a standard
deviation of 4.4 versus 2.5 for national government size, and 5.7 versus 4.2 for
aggregate government size). Over the same time period, the average national
government size in the developing-country group ranges from 10% of GDP in
South Africa to 60% in Israel, and aggregate government size ranges from 11%
ofGDPinParaguayto66%inIsrael.Forindustrialcountries,theaveragenational
government size ranges from 22% of GDP in Switzerland to 45% in Ireland,J. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293 279
Table 2A
Descriptive statistics of government sizes for each country (1980–1994)
Country Subnational govt. size National govt. size Total govt. size
Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Developing 6.04 .28 .41 .32 3 .91 7 .63 1 .44 .42 9 .02 0 .23 8 .9 5.7
countries
Argentina 8.45 .01 0 .41 .71 3 .69 .41 8 .22 .52 2 .01 7 .72 5 .0 2.7
Bolivia 4.21 .59 .42 .11 8 .11 2 .42 4 .04 .22 0 .81 .53 2 .0 8.3
Brazil 13.99 .41 9 .43 .72 7 .12 0 .23 7 .26 .04 1 .02 9 .85 6 .7 9.3
Chile 2.21 .13 .40 .62 6 .21 9 .93 4 .15 .02 7 .02 0 .43 7 .6 5.7
Colombia 5.95 .26 .60 .41 4 .51 3 .41 6 .01 .01 6 .91 1 .52 1 .7 3.8
India 13.31 1 .81 4 .30 .81 6 .01 3 .01 7 .91 .72 8 .61 5 .83 2 .2 4.0
Indonesia 2.52 .03 .10 .32 0 .11 6 .52 4 .42 .52 1 .31 4 .62 7 .4 3.9
Iran 1.00 .81 .30 .22 5 .81 7 .73 5 .76 .52 4 .91 8 .63 7 .0 5.8
Israel 7.25 .58 .60 .76 0 .23 7 .78 9 .11 6 .06 6 .34 3 .29 7 .7 16.5
Malaysia 6.84 .88 .31 .22 9 .12 1 .93 8 .44 .43 5 .92 6 .74 6 .7 5.4
Mexico 4.73 .76 .60 .92 0 .01 4 .43 0 .35 .32 4 .81 9 .33 4 .0 4.8
Paraguay 0.40 .20 .60 .21 0 .28 .11 3 .51 .81 0 .78 .61 3 .8 1.6
South Africa 10.47 .01 9 .94 .13 0 .82 2 .13 8 .04 .14 1 .33 1 .45 4 .6 6.5
Thailand 1.51 .13 .50 .51 7 .21 4 .12 0 .52 .21 8 .71 5 .22 2 .3 2.5
Zimbabwe 7.04 .31 1 .02 .02 8 .72 3 .53 3 .82 .63 5 .02 9 .04 4 .8 4.4
Industrial 17.41 4 .81 9 .91 .63 7 .03 2 .94 0 .82 .55 4 .14 6 .56 0 .0 4.2
countries
Australia 17.71 5 .51 9 .71 .32 5 .32 2 .72 7 .11 .54 3 .03 8 .14 6 .3 2.6
Austria 17.21 6 .41 8 .80 .93 9 .33 6 .64 2 .01 .55 6 .65 3 .16 0 .8 2.3
Belgium 6.95 .98 .40 .95 1 .44 8 .25 6 .03 .05 8 .35 4 .26 3 .9 3.8
Canada 31.32 3 .73 5 .52 .82 3 .72 1 .12 5 .31 .35 5 .04 7 .96 0 .8 3.6
Denmark 32.22 9 .73 4 .91 .44 0 .43 7 .34 3 .01 .97 2 .56 7 .17 6 .8 2.9
France 10.57 .81 6 .73 .04 4 .13 9 .54 7 .22 .05 4 .54 7 .36 0 .9 3.9
Germany 22.91 9 .22 4 .51 .93 3 .03 0 .23 3 .91 .45 6 .04 9 .45 8 .1 3.3
Iceland 9.07 .91 0 .40 .82 9 .72 4 .83 4 .43 .43 7 .53 2 .24 4 .3 4.3
Ireland 14.41 1 .81 6 .91 .94 5 .13 8 .15 1 .44 .95 9 .55 0 .76 7 .7 6.7
Luxemburg 7.56 .19 .00 .94 2 .63 9 .14 6 .52 .24 9 .33 6 .45 4 .4 4.1
Netherlands 17.71 5 .62 0 .31 .55 3 .94 8 .05 7 .72 .77 1 .66 4 .07 8 .0 4.0
Norway 18.51 6 .72 0 .71 .33 8 .03 3 .74 3 .23 .25 6 .65 0 .46 3 .2 4.4
Spain 10.93 .31 6 .54 .53 3 .22 6 .53 9 .43 .64 4 .12 9 .85 5 .9 8.0
Sweden 25.02 2 .92 6 .91 .44 3 .93 9 .35 1 .73 .66 8 .96 2 .87 7 .2 3.8
Switzerland 23.12 1 .32 4 .91 .52 2 .51 8 .42 6 .63 .54 2 .12 2 .45 1 .5 9.5
United Kingdom 12.81 2 .21 3 .70 .53 9 .43 3 .94 3 .22 .65 2 .24 6 .25 6 .3 2.8
United States 18.21 6 .52 0 .21 .42 3 .42 2 .02 5 .00 .94 1 .63 8 .84 4 .6 1.6
and aggregate government size ranges from 36% of GDP in Iceland to 73% in
Denmark.
The time path of the dependent variables is shown in Table 2B. For the whole
sample, the average subnational government size increased from 11.3% of GDP
in 1980 to 14.5%in 1994;the average nationalgovernmentsize ﬂuctuated around
32% of GDP; and the total government size rose from 41.3% of GDP in 1980 to
44.8%in1983,anditthendeclinedto39.8%ofGDPandroseagaintoahighlevel
of 45.2% in 1994. The three government sizes for the developing-country group
are relatively rather stable, whereas the corresponding ones for the industrial-
country group have shown a rising trend. Speciﬁcally, for the industrial-country
group,subnationalgovernmentsize rosefrom16.3%ofGDPin1980tomorethan
18% in the 1990s; national government size and total government size increased
quickly in the early 1980s and ﬂuctuated around 38% of GDP and 55% of GDP,
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Table 2B
The time path of average government sizes by country group
Years 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
All countries
Subnational govt. size 11.31 1 .91 2 .41 2 .41 1 .81 1 .01 1 .01 1 .31 1 .11 1 .41 2 .41 3 .01 3 .41 3 .71 4 .5
National govt. size 30.13 2 .03 3 .33 3 .63 2 .23 2 .43 1 .73 1 .63 0 .52 9 .83 0 .93 0 .33 1 .83 2 .63 3 .1
Total govt. size 41.34 2 .74 4 .64 4 .84 4 .14 2 .34 2 .64 2 .04 0 .73 9 .53 9 .84 0 .94 3 .14 4 .14 5 .2
Developing countries
Subnational govt. size 5.56 .06 .16 .25 .95 .75 .76 .05 .75 .76 .66 .46 .56 .98 .8
National govt. size 24.82 6 .92 8 .02 8 .02 6 .22 5 .62 4 .92 4 .72 3 .32 2 .72 3 .22 1 .12 2 .82 3 .62 4 .2
Total govt. size 30.33 1 .33 2 .63 2 .53 2 .12 9 .73 0 .62 9 .62 8 .02 7 .02 7 .32 5 .52 7 .92 8 .93 0 .9
Industrial countries
Subnational govt. size 16.31 6 .61 7 .51 7 .41 7 .01 6 .31 6 .31 6 .31 6 .21 6 .61 6 .81 7 .71 8 .41 8 .51 8 .1
National govt. size 34.73 6 .13 7 .53 8 .23 7 .53 8 .73 8 .43 8 .13 7 .33 6 .43 7 .13 6 .83 8 .13 9 .03 8 .6
Total govt. size 51.05 2 .75 5 .15 5 .55 4 .55 5 .05 4 .75 4 .35 3 .55 2 .05 1 .65 4 .55 6 .55 7 .55 5 .3
3.2.2. Fiscal decentralization variables
As indicated earlier, three different variables are used to proxy the level of
ﬁscal decentralization: expenditure decentralization (measured as the ratio of
subnationalto total governmentexpenditure),revenuedecentralization(measured
as the ratio of subnational own source revenue to total government revenue), and
verticalimbalance (measured as the percentage of expendituresat the subnational
level ﬁnancedby centraltransfers). Table 3A summarizesthe descriptivestatistics
of these ﬁscal decentralization measures for each country averaged over the
period of 1980 to 1994. Generally, expenditures are 5% more decentralized than
revenues for developing and industrial countries alike as shown by the mean
values. In addition, industrial countries are more decentralized than developing
countries in both expenditures and revenues (32 and 27% for industrial countries
versus 20 and 15% for developing countries). Vertical imbalance is larger in the
industrial countries (41%) than in developing countries (35%). It is also more
widely dispersed in developing countries (with an average standard deviation of
11%) than in industrial countries (with an average standard deviation of 6%).
Table 3B presents the time path of the three decentralization measures by
country groups. For the whole sample of 32 countries, both expenditures and
revenues were increasingly decentralized from 25 and 20%, respectively, in
the mid-1980s to around 29 and 25% in 1994. Vertical imbalance presented a
declining trend from around 40% in the early 1980s to around 35% in the early
1990s.
If we look at developing- and industrial-country groups separately, the most
salient feature for the developing-country group is that vertical imbalance
substantially and consistently decreased from 45% in 1982 to 29% in 1994—
a reduction of 16%. Revenue decentralization had stabilized at around 14%
until 1985 before it continuously increased to 20% in 1994, while expenditure
decentralization ﬂuctuated widely between 20 and 31%.
For industrialcountries, vertical imbalance decreased from 40% in the 1981 to
36% in 1989 and then increased to 43% in 1992 before it dropped back to 39% inJ. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293 281
Table 3A
Descriptive statistics of ﬁscal decentralization measures for each country (1980–1994)
Country Expenditure decentralization Revenue decentralization Vertical imbalance
Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Developing 19.71 5 .22 5 .03 .01 5 .01 1 .11 8 .32 .33 4 .91 9 .65 4 .3 10.7
countries
Argentina 38.32 2 .24 6 .87 .13 2 .71 6 .54 2 .49 .12 8 .30 .06 2 .5 19.1
Bolivia 19.31 4 .82 9 .43 .81 8 .61 3 .72 3 .03 .01 4 .4 −14.85 2 .4 17.4
Brazil 33.72 8 .74 2 .43 .42 4 .91 8 .63 0 .03 .83 6 .32 5 .04 2 .9 5.4
Chile 7.63 .79 .81 .45 .82 .57 .11 .22 3 .01 .24 9 .4 15.8
Colombia 29.02 6 .33 2 .11 .91 9 .11 5 .72 1 .41 .85 3 .34 7 .55 8 .6 3.6
India 45.54 3 .14 7 .61 .43 3 .23 1 .23 5 .81 .35 0 .14 7 .15 2 .6 1.7
Indonesia 11.29 .61 2 .61 .02 .82 .23 .70 .47 7 .57 0 .38 2 .7 3.6
Iran 3.82 .64 .90 .94 .72 .46 .71 .61 6 .44 .83 1 .2 8.1
Israel 11.28 .11 4 .32 .27 .23 .69 .72 .55 1 .43 5 .77 3 .6 13.6
Malaysia 18.91 7 .02 1 .51 .51 6 .11 3 .02 0 .91 .92 1 .70 .24 3 .6 15.7
Mexico 20.11 1 .03 0 .56 .22 0 .41 7 .82 2 .91 .51 5 .5 −2.93 2 .5 11.8
Paraguay 3.81 .85 .91 .73 .01 .15 .11 .51 7 .86 .83 4 .6 7.9
South Africa 24.91 8 .43 6 .66 .31 4 .01 0 .31 7 .12 .15 5 .94 6 .37 9 .2 9.9
Thailand 8.17 .01 5 .82 .15 .54 .76 .20 .43 2 .61 4 .77 6 .5 15.6
Zimbabwe 19.41 3 .52 4 .53 .61 7 .01 2 .92 2 .32 .62 9 .11 2 .04 2 .0 10.7
Industrial 32.02 8 .93 4 .81 .92 7 .32 4 .62 9 .51 .64 1 .03 1 .65 0 .7 6.3
countries
Australia 41.23 9 .44 3 .51 .32 8 .22 3 .83 3 .73 .64 6 .63 5 .35 4 .7 6.4
Austria 30.42 9 .53 1 .40 .62 7 .12 6 .32 8 .60 .82 4 .01 7 .32 8 .2 3.2
Belgium 11.81 0 .71 4 .11 .06 2 .06 0 .66 3 .10 .86 0 .25 0 .97 1 .9 6.3
Canada 56.84 9 .45 8 .32 .25 1 .54 5 .35 3 .11 .93 1 .82 8 .23 6 .3 2.5
Denmark 44.44 2 .64 7 .51 .23 1 .22 8 .83 2 .21 .04 5 .74 2 .35 2 .3 3.5
France 19.01 6 .22 7 .54 .01 1 .99 .61 3 .61 .44 3 .73 3 .47 3 .3 13.5
Germany 41.43 8 .94 3 .61 .03 5 .13 3 .53 6 .71 .02 6 .82 1 .23 2 .8 3.7
Iceland 23.32 1 .12 7 .01 .82 2 .92 1 .22 5 .21 .38 .5 −0.71 9 .9 5.2
Ireland 24.22 1 .62 6 .51 .18 .87 .99 .70 .57 4 .36 7 .67 9 .8 3.8
Luxemburg 15.01 2 .51 6 .91 .58 .76 .51 0 .71 .44 2 .53 4 .06 0 .9 8.9
Netherlands 24.72 3 .32 6 .00 .97 .75 .71 1 .01 .67 6 .46 4 .98 3 .3 6.0
Norway 32.83 1 .53 4 .50 .82 1 .62 0 .12 2 .90 .93 9 .43 7 .34 1 .1 1.3
Spain 23.61 1 .03 1 .16 .51 4 .71 1 .11 7 .41 .74 7 .17 .96 4 .9 19.2
Sweden 36.33 1 .74 0 .12 .23 2 .92 9 .63 5 .82 .12 1 .41 3 .12 6 .2 3.9
Switzerland 51.04 8 .35 0 .32 .24 5 .64 3 .84 7 .31 .52 5 .82 0 .43 1 .3 3.7
United Kingdom 24.62 2 .72 6 .51 .21 3 .38 .01 6 .83 .55 6 .24 1 .67 4 .5 12.6
United States 43.84 0 .84 7 .32 .14 0 .43 5 .64 3 .12 .12 6 .12 2 .73 0 .6 2.5
Table 3B
The time path of average decentralization measures by country group
Years 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
All countries
Expenditure 26.72 7 .82 6 .92 5 .72 6 .72 5 .02 5 .22 4 .52 4 .82 6 .12 6 .42 7 .92 7 .62 6 .82 8 .5
decentralization
Revenue decentralization 21.12 1 .72 1 .62 1 .82 1 .41 9 .72 0 .02 0 .22 1 .32 2 .02 1 .92 3 .12 3 .02 3 .32 4 .8
Vertical imbalance 38.04 1 .24 1 .74 1 .03 8 .33 7 .63 6 .33 5 .33 4 .93 2 .73 4 .83 4 .93 6 .83 5 .33 5 .3
Developing countries
Expenditure 19.73 0 .72 6 .62 1 .92 7 .02 6 .52 7 .12 3 .62 3 .12 9 .02 0 .92 5 .72 8 .43 0 .82 6 .3
decentralization
Revenue decentralization 14.01 5 .01 4 .51 4 .61 4 .31 3 .21 3 .81 3 .81 5 .91 5 .81 6 .21 7 .11 6 .41 7 .02 0 .0
Vertical imbalance 39.44 2 .64 4 .74 4 .34 0 .03 8 .13 5 .13 2 .83 2 .22 9 .13 2 .33 0 .93 0 .12 8 .92 8 .7
Industrial countries
Expenditure 32.42 5 .02 7 .12 9 .02 6 .42 3 .62 3 .52 5 .32 6 .22 2 .63 0 .62 9 .52 6 .82 2 .63 0 .4
dcentralization
Revenue decentralization 27.02 6 .82 7 .12 7 .22 7 .22 5 .82 5 .82 5 .92 6 .02 7 .42 6 .22 7 .42 7 .62 7 .82 7 .8
Vertical imbalance 36.84 0 .13 9 .33 8 .53 6 .93 7 .03 7 .33 7 .53 7 .33 5 .73 6 .63 7 .84 1 .83 9 .93 9 .4282 J. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293
1994.Revenuedecentralizationstabilized between26 and 28% while expenditure
decentralization ﬂuctuated between 23 and 32%.
It is interesting to observe that for both developing and industrial countries,
expenditure decentralization tends to ﬂuctuate dramatically—between 20 and
31% for developing countries and between 23 and 32% for industrial countries—
in comparison with the relatively stable levels of revenue decentralization, which
stayed around 14% until 1987 before gradually increasing to 20% in 1994 for
developingcountriesand staying between 26 to 28% for industrialcountries.This
patternindicatesthat expenditurescan beeasily altered(in the legaloroperational
sense) with the change in ﬁscal policies and economic environments.
3.2.3. Political/institutional variables
Four variables are used to measure the inﬂuence of political/institutional
factors on government size at one or more levels. The ﬁrst variable measures the
lack of independenceof the central bank(called political central bank). A dummy
variable equals one if the central bank governor changes within 6 months of
a political transition and zero otherwise. The source of this information is
Cukierman and Webb [23] and the Europa World Yearbook [24].
Thetwoadditionalvariablesaredummiestomeasurethepossibleeffectsofthe
political environment on central and/or subnational public ﬁnance: (1) Unitary
state versus federal state. A dummy variable equals one if the country is
a federation and zero otherwise. (2) Elected versus non-elected subnational
governments. A dummy variable equals one if the subnational government is
elected and zero otherwise.The source of this informationis primarilythe Europa
WorldYearbook[24],withadditionalinformationfromthecountryreportsbyThe
Economist Intelligence Unit [25].
Other researchers have found that constraints on subnational borrowing could
help improve ﬁscal performance of subnational governments and restrain the
overall size of government (Ter-Minassian and Craig [26] and IDB [27]). The
dummy variable designed to capture this effect equals one if the country has
any form of prohibition against borrowing by subnational government or a non-
discretionary rule to constraint it ex ante, which are the two types of constraints
Ter-Minassian and Craig [26] considered, and zero otherwise.
3.2.4. Control variables
To ensure that any correlation between ﬁscal decentralization and government
sizes is not due to the effect of the general macroeconomic environment, ﬁve
control variablesare includedin the analysis: (1) the growthrate of real per capita
GDP, (2) real GDP per capita, (3) changes in the consumerprice index (CPI) with
a one-year lag, (4) openness, measured by the sum of imports and exports as a
percentage in GDP, and (5) the percentage of urban population. Sources of these
variables are the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF [22] and the
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3.3. Methodology
To investigate the relationship between the size of government and ﬁscal
decentralization and other political and economic variables, the following model
is adopted:
GovtSizei,t = αi +α1FDi,t +α2Politicali,t +α3Controli,t +εi,t,
where GovtSizei,t represents the three different measures of government size,
i.e., GovtSizei,t is the aggregate government size, or national government
size, or subnational government size; αi is the country ﬁxed effects; FDi,t
represents the three different measures of ﬁscal decentralization, i.e., FDi,t is the
expenditure decentralization, or revenue decentralization, or vertical imbalance.
When measuring ﬁscal decentralization using vertical imbalance, an interaction
term between vertical imbalance and borrowing constraints is added to capture
at least part of the effect of having hard/soft budget constraints at the subnational
level(seeStein[8]).Politicali,t representsthefourpolitical/institutionalvariables,
i.e., the presence of borrowing constraints, subnational government elected,
federal versus unitary states, and political central bank. Controli,t is the other
ﬁve control variables in our regression analysis.
First, all coefﬁcients are estimated using the ﬁxed-effects approach. Second,
since the ﬁxed-effects approach has the disadvantage of dropping the variables
that may reﬂect important economic and, in particular, institutional aspects of
the model, the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method is also adopted
with the corrections for panel heteroskedasticity and panel serial correlation. This
approach is used because in many cross-section data sets the variance for each of
the panels differs. Moreover, the correlation parameter of serial correlation may
also be unique for each panel.
4. Results
Tables 4A, 5A, and 6A present the regression results on how ﬁscal decen-
tralization affects subnational, national, and aggregate government size using the
ﬁxed-effectsapproach,andTables4B, 5B, and6Breportthe correspondingFGLS
results. As we mentioned earlier, it is obvious that decentralization should in-
crease the size ofsubnationalgovernmentswhile shrinkingthesize ofthe national
government. This almost tautological point is fully supported in our regression
analyses (using both the ﬁxed-effects approach and FGLS).
4.1. Subnationalgovernment size
Table 4A shows the ﬁxed-effectsestimationson the relationshipbetween ﬁscal
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Table 4A
Decentralization and subnational government size (ﬁxed effects)








Vertical imbalance ∗borrowing constraints 0.063c
(3.090)
Real GDP per capita (USD) −5.75 ×10−5 −7.29 ×10−5 −3.9 ×10−5
(−1.249)( −1.194)( −0.804)
Real GDP growth rate −0.063c −0.059b −0.032
(−3.307)( −2.304)( −1.569)
Presence of borrowing constraints dropped dropped dropped
Subnational govt. elected −1.228a 0.678 −1.783b
(−1.993)( 0.909)( −2.843)
Federal vs. unitary state dropped dropped dropped
Political Central Bank 1.032c 0.416 0.681b
(4.326) (1.455) (2.691)
Urban population 0.111b 0.112 0.286c
(2.158) (1.627) (5.133)
Openness −0.005 −0.012 −0.007
(−0.554)( −0.963)( −0.630)
Lag CPI inﬂation 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.840)( 0.593)( 2.399)
Constant −3.037 3.012 −9.080b
(−0.991)( 0.751)( −2.710)
Number of observations 345 346 347
Number of groups 32 32 32
R2 within 0.4883 0.1003 0.4171
R2 between 0.6802 0.2277 0.068
R2 overall 0.6667 0.2142 0.0854
The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
b Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
c Indicates a signiﬁcance at 1%.
revenue decentralization, and vertical imbalance are all found to be positively
and signiﬁcantly associated with subnational government size. The FGLS
regressions in Table 4B demonstrate very similar results with a close magnitude
of estimated coefﬁcients. These ﬁndings conﬁrm John Wallis’s hypothesis that
ﬁscal decentralization may lead to larger subnational governments because local
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Table 4B
Decentralization and subnational government size (FGLS)








Vertical imbalance ∗ borrow constraints −0.007
(−0.383)
Real GDP per capita (USD) 3.150 ×10−4c 4.638 ×10−4c 0.001c
(14.857) (10.239) (16.260)
Real GDP growth rate −0.048c −0.044c −0.056c
(−5.866)( −4.578)( −5.314)
Presence of borrowing constraints 0.004 −1.745 0.941
(0.015) (−1.435) (0.898)
Subnational govt. elected −0.419 0.825b 1.277c
(−1.467)( 2.105) (3.711)
Federal vs. unitary state −1.007c −3.237c −2.787c
(−2.559)( −6.310)( −5.098)
Political Central Bank 0.385c 0.287b 0.354c
(3.729) (2.174) (2.910)
Urban population 0.008a −0.044c −0.035c
(1.637) (−3.288)( −2.633)
Openness 0.001 −0.003 −0.014b
(0.249) (−0.604)( −2.217)
Lag CPI inﬂation −1.033×10−4 1.630 ×10−5 1.190 ×10−4c
(−1.484) (0.218) (3.233)
Constant −1.359c 6.449c 4.00c
(−3.509) (4.207) (3.172)
Number of observations 345 346 347
Number of groups 31 31 31
χ2 2287 533 746
Log likelihood −158 −236 −234
P 0.000 0.000 0.000
Computed R2 0.879 0.530 0.614
The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
b Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
c Indicates a signiﬁcance at 1%.
at the national level may empower local governments with a wider range of
functions and responsibilities.
In the equations using expenditure decentralization and vertical imbalance
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(Table 4A). But when using FGLS estimations with the control of revenue
decentralization and vertical imbalance, elected subnational governments tend to
expand(Table 4B). These seemingly contradictory,inconclusiveﬁndings indicate
that political participation may not be a powerful institutional constraint on
subnational governments. In particular, political participation could be relatively
ineffective in restraining the growth of the public sector at the subnational level
when more revenues are at the discretion of local ofﬁcials.
Table 4B shows that a federal state tends to have a smaller subnational
government than a unitary state. This effect is not detected in the ﬁxed-effects
estimations because the variable is dropped (see Table 4A). Both Tables 4A
and 4B indicate that a less independent central bank (political central bank), as
predicted, increases subnational government size resulting from less independent
monetary policy and perhaps even monetization of ﬁscal deﬁcits. But the effect
of borrowing constraints on subnational government size has not been consistent
and/or signiﬁcant in Table 4B.
Among the other control variables, real GDP growth rate is negatively related
to subnational government size. Urban population is positively associated with
subnational government size, as is the lagged CPI inﬂation in the equation using
vertical imbalance. But the borrowing constraints/vertical imbalance interaction
variable tends to have mixed and even insigniﬁcant signs.
4.2. National government size
Tables 5A and 5B show the regression results for the relationship between
ﬁscal decentralization and national government size using the ﬁxed-effects
approach and FGLS, respectively. As expected, both expenditure and revenue
decentralization lead to a smaller national government. But note that a vertical
imbalance, besides its positive effect on subnational governmentsize (Table 4A),
increases the size of national government as well. A possible explanation is
that intergovernmental transfers in the form of matching grants to subnational
governmentsgives them more incentive to expand spending in order to lure more
transfers from the central government. When matching grants increase, national
spending itself will also rise proportionally. That is to say, to make lots of grants
to subnational governments, the national governmentmust itself be large.
For the two estimation approaches (Tables 5A and 5B), a less independent
central bank signiﬁcantly increases national government size; and a nation with
elected subnational governments does not necessarily have a smaller size of the
national government. Furthermore, a federal state is likely to reduce the sizes
of both national (Table 5B) and subnational governments (Table 4B). Among
other controlvariables, the presenceof borrowingconstraintstendsto have mixed
effects on national government size; higher GDP growth rates reduce national
government size; and openness is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with the
size of the public sector at the national level. In addition, the interaction variableJ. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293 287
Table 5A
Decentralization and national government size (ﬁxed-effects)








Vertical imbalance ∗ borrowing constraints 0.108
(1.705)
Real GDP per capita (USD) −1.111 ×10−4 −9.333 ×10−5 −3.72 ×10−5
(−0.672)( −0.569)( −0.243)
Real GDP growth rate −0.243c −0.240c −0.201c
(−3.521)( −3.509)( −3.120)
Presence of borrowing constraints dropped dropped dropped
Subnational govt. elected 1.341 −0.307 −4.697b
(0.605) (−0.142)( −2.249)
Federal vs. unitary state dropped dropped dropped
Political Central Bank 3.355c 4.223c 3.8844c
(3.911) (4.959) (4.928)
Urban population −0.412b −0.313 −0.180
(−2.227)( −1.689)( −1.038)
Openness 0.063a 0.062a 0.089b
(1.817) (1.790) (2.742)
Lag CPI inﬂation 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.430)( −0.500)( −0.161)
Constant 63.735c 58.975c 34.134c
(5.784) (5.447) (3.252)
Number of observations 345 346 347
Number of groups 32 32 31
R2 within 0.1603 0.1754 0.2848
R2 between 0.07 0.0469 0.004
R2 overall 0.0546 0.0357 0.009
The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
b Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
c Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 1%.
of borrowing constraints/vertical imbalance has opposite effects on national
governmentsize for the two estimation approaches.
4.3. Aggregate government size
Tables 6A and 6B report the regression results on the relationship between
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Table 5B
Decentralization and national government size (FGLS)








Vertical imbalance ∗borrow constraints −0.138c
(−4.207)
Real GDP per capita (USD) 2.788 ×10−4c 1.859 ×10−4b 2.830 ×10−5
(3.248) (2.237) (0.495)
Real GDP growth rate −0.176c −0.175c −0.123c
(−6.324)( −5.535)( −3.969)
Presence of borrowing constraints −0.721 2.027 4.615b
(−0.420) (1.172) (2.467)
Subnational govt. elected 0.581 0.058 −1.712
(0.454) (0.045) (−1.591)
Federal vs. unitary state −1.751 1.876 −2.706b
(−0.855) (1.177) (−2.494)
Political Central Bank 1.120c 1.640c 1.258c
(2.971) (3.606) (3.253)
Urban population 0.202c 0.212c 0.298c
(4.930) (5.087) (9.895)
Openness 0.038b 0.074c 0.100c
(2.332) (4.310) (7.849)
Lag CPI inﬂation −2.172 ×10−4 −2.592×10−4 −1.537 ×10−4
(−0.865)( −0.936)( −0.782)
Constant 19.392c 11.652c −2.980a
(8.670) (5.027) (−1.881)
Number of observations 345 345 345
Number of groups 31 31 31
χ2 241 180 1430
Log likelihood −518 −549 −546
P 0.000 0.000 0.000
Computed R2 0.189 0.141 0.567
The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
b Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
c Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 1%.
approaches and FGLS, respectively. It is found that aggregate government size
is negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with revenue decentralization with the
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Table 6A
Decentralization and aggregate government size (ﬁxed-effects)








Vertical imbalance ∗ borrowing
constraints 0.185b
(2.588)
Real GDP per capita (USD) −1.686 ×10−4 −1.695 ×10−4 −2.058 ×10−4
(−0.850)( −0.849)( −1.208)
Real GDP growth rate −0.307c −0.283c −0.223c
(−3.704)( −3.397)( −3.037)
Presence of borrowing constraints dropped dropped dropped
Subnational govt. elected 0.113 3.646 −3.677
(0.043) (1.496) (−1.666)
Federal vs. unitary state dropped dropped dropped
Political Central Bank 4.387c 4.618c 4.441c
(4.266) (4.456) (4.990)
Urban population −0.301 −0.187 0.126
(−1.358)( −0.831) (0.640)
Openness 0.058 0.048 0.079b
(1.387) (1.136) (2.161)
Lag CPI inﬂation 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.554) (0.420) (1.200)
Constant 60.698c 58.411c 23.699b
(4.595) (4.449) (2.011)
Number of observations 345 346 347
Number of groups 32 32 32
R2 within 0.1159 0.1286 0.3737
R2 between 0.2883 0.2072 0.0605
R2 overall 0.2324 0.1539 0.0974
The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
b Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
c Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 1%.
share in total revenuesreduces national governmentsize (Table 5A) by more than
it increases subnational governmentsize (Table 4A).
Like Oates’s [14] empirical results based on cross-section, cross-country
regressions, we also ﬁnd a positive association between expenditure decentraliza-
tion and aggregate government size for both approaches. Whereas the estimated
coefﬁcient for FGLS is highly signiﬁcant, the corresponding one from the ﬁxed-290 J. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293
Table 6B
Decentralization and aggregate government size (FGLS)








Vertical imbalance ∗borrowing constraints −0.034
(−0.837)
Real GDP per capita (USD) 5.00 ×10−4c 0.001c 0.001c
(4.482) (6.840) (5.874)
Real GDP growth rate −0.256c −0.235c −0.225c
(−6.790)( −6.056)( −5.819)
Presence of borrowing constraints −0.652 −1.305 −0.656
(−0.334)( −0.600)( −0.253)
Subnational govt. elected 0.703 0.570 1.820
(0.497) (0.337) (1.221)
Federal vs. unitary state −6.936b −4.498 −5.781c
(−2.020)( −1.391)( −3.045)
Political Central Bank 2.041c 1.785c 2.095c
(4.572) (3.130) (3.817)
Urban population 0.238c 0.152c 0.300c
(5.148) (2.924) (6.911)
Openness 0.021 0.056c 0.058c
(1.028) (2.775) (2.934)
Lag CPI inﬂation −2.800 ×10−4 −1.33 ×10−4 2.18 ×10−4
(−0.751)( −0.231) (0.428)
Constant 16.804c 19.540c 1.595
(2.454) (6.989) (0.865)
Number of observations 345 346 347
Number of groups 31 31 31
χ2 388 302 1266
Log likelihood −615 −640 −649
P 0.000 0.000 0.000
Computed R2 0.240 0.191 0.494
The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
b Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
c Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 1%.
effects model is not signiﬁcant. This inconsistency may suggest that given the
sample countries and the time span of this regression, expenditure decentraliza-
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size to nearly the same extent and hence affect aggregate government size mar-
ginally.
Since vertical imbalance, as demonstrated in Tables 4A and 5A and is
positively associated with both subnational and national government size, it
leads to a larger aggregate government size (Tables 6A and 6B). This ﬁnding
conﬁrms the common belief that vertical imbalance exacerbates the problem
of the commons, ampliﬁes the ﬂypaper effect, and consequently encourages
the expansion of the public sector at subnational level and forces the national
government to grow proportionately. As a result, the greater the share of
intergovernmental transfers in subnational public spending, the bigger the
aggregate government size. This outcome is fully consistent with the results of
Oates [14], Grossman [19], Edhaie [20], Stein [8], and others.
As for other variables, it is found that a less independent central bank
(political central bank) increases both subnational and national government sizes
signiﬁcantly, leading to a larger aggregated public sector. A federal state, with
a more decentralized regime than a unitary one, has a smaller aggregate public
sector (Table 6B). The presence of borrowing constraints, however, shows no
signiﬁcant effect on aggregate government size. The rate of real GDP growth
is negatively associated with aggregate government size, whereas inﬂation has
no signiﬁcant effect. Moreover, both urbanization and openness raise aggregate
governmentsize.Finally,theinteractionvariableofborrowingconstraints/vertical
imbalance hasmixed and eveninsigniﬁcant effectson aggregategovernmentsize.
5. Summary
This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to examine the effects of ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion on the sizes of the subnational, national, and aggregate governments. Using
an econometric analysis of a panel of 32 industrial and developing countries,
1980–1994, we ﬁnd that expenditure decentralization leads to larger aggregate
and subnational governments, and smaller national governments. Revenue de-
centralization leads to larger subnational governments, but it reduces national
governmentsizebymorethanitincreasessubnationalgovernmentsize,andthere-
fore leads to a smaller aggregategovernment.Vertical imbalance is the only ﬁscal
variable that can increase the sizes of public sector at all levels (subnational, na-
tional, and aggregate).
Controlling for political and institutional variables, the analysis shows that
a less independent central bank is associated with larger governments at both
subnational and national levels, and hence larger aggregate government. When
using expenditure decentralization and vertical imbalance as decentralization
measures, elected subnational government seems effective in restraining the
publicsectorat subnationallevel.Intheregressionusingrevenuedecentralization,292 J. Jin, H. Zou / Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002) 270–293
an elected subnational government is likely to expand, although the effect is
insigniﬁcant.
The feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimations also indicate that,
in general, borrowing constraints have no signiﬁcant effect on government size
at any level (subnational, national and aggregate). Federal states, with a more
decentralized regime than a unitary one, tend to have a smaller overall public
sector.
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